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Abstract One focus of work on the processing of linguistic meaning has been the
relative processing speed of different aspects of meaning. While much early work
has focused on implicatures in comparison to literal asserted content (e.g., Bott &
Noveck 2004; Huang & Snedeker 2009, among many others), the present paper ex-
tends recent efforts to experimentally investigate another aspect of meaning, namely
presuppositions. It investigates the triggers again and stop using the visual world
eye tracking paradigm, and provides evidence for rapid processing of presupposed
content. Our study finds no difference in timing for the two triggers, which is of
theoretical relevance given proposals for distinguishing classes of triggers, such as
hard vs. soft (Abusch 2010). Whatever differences between these there may be are
apparently not affecting the online processing time-course. As a further comparison,
again was also compared to twice, which expresses essentially the same meaning
without a presupposition. Shifts in eye movements for these two cases also appear
to be entirely on par, further supporting the notion that presupposed and asserted
content are available in parallel early on in online processing.
Keywords: presuppositions, presupposition triggers, presupposition projection, negation,
experimental pragmatics, visual world paradigm
1 Introduction
When comprehending a sentence uttered in context, hearers quickly arrive at their
best guess at what we might call the ‘overall conveyed meaning’, seemingly without
any obvious effort. However, many decades of research on meaning in philosophy of
language and linguistics have taught us that this overall meaning is not monolithic,
but rather a composite of various different types of ingredients. Since the distinctions
between these aspects of meaning are by no means obvious to the naive speaker,
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it is the job of the theoretician to tease them apart. Key theoretical questions in
this regard include a) just what aspects of meaning there are, b) what properties
the various classes of meaning have, and c) how they come about. The traditional
picture emerging from the extensive theoretical literature, largely building on the
seminal work by Paul Grice (Grice 1975), includes four core aspects of meaning,
which can be illustrated with the example in (1):
(1) Some of the students have failed the damn exam again.
a. Literal asserted content: a subset of students failed (literal some)
b. Conversational Implicature (scalar): not all of the students failed (some)
c. Presuppositions: this happened before (again)
d.Conventional Implicature / Expressive:
speaker feels negatively about the exam (damn)
While the general need for distinctions between classes and even the broad
outlines for specific categories of meaning are quite generally established, lively
debates continue in the current literature with regards to the exact properties of each
class and the details of where the lines between classes are to be drawn. In recent
years, the value of experimental approaches to investigating issues related to this
has become increasingly evident, as they can help to test and refine theoretically
motivated distinctions based on a systematic empirical evaluation of specific ex-
pressions. Eventually, this will help to assess the potential need for redrawing some
of the traditional boundaries as well as for making more fine-grained distinctions
between sub-types of meaning.
On a more general level, experimental approaches also open up novel perspec-
tives by combining insights from formal semantics and pragmatics with perspectives
from psychology and cognitive science on the actual mental processes involved in
language comprehension. One question of particular interest in this regard concerns
the time-course of access to different aspects of meaning, specifically in relation to
one another. Uncovering the relative order in which different ingredients of meaning
arise in actual processing has the potential to inform the question of how they come
about and in what ways they might depend on one another. Ultimately, a comprehen-
sive perspective on how each component of meaning enters the picture and how they
all are combined into the overall conveyed meaning will significantly enrich both our
theoretical understanding as well as theories of language processing. The perhaps
most well-studied point in case, scalar implicatures, can serve as an illustration.
The some-but-not-all implicature of some (already illustrated in (1)) is generally
assumed to be a pragmatic enrichment of literal content. This could be introduced
as a type of default, due to its common presence with some, or, alternatively, may
involve an effortful computation on each occurrence. Following Bott & Noveck
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(2004), there has been a sizable body of evidence in favor of the latter view from var-
ious methodologies (including the visual world paradigm, e.g., Huang & Snedeker
2009). However, more recent results, primarily based on the visual world paradigm
(Grodner, Klein, Carbary & Tanenhaus 2010; Breheny, Ferguson & Katsos 2013,
among others), suggest that implicatures can be rapidly available, at least in some
contexts. While the jury is still out on resolving this seemingly conflicting data, the
debates over recent years in this area have shown that both theoretical and processing
perspectives are greatly enriched by incorporating experimental methodologies in
studying these types of phenomena.
The present paper presents experimental investigations of another aspect of
meaning, presuppositions, using the visual world paradigm. I begin with a brief
review of the theoretical landscape and previous experimental work on presuppo-
sitions. Next I present two experiments, which look at the presupposition triggers
again and stop respectively. Finally, I discuss possible interpretations of the results
in a broader context and provide an outlook on further directions of research, some
of which are already well under way.
2 Background
2.1 Theoretical perspectives on presuppositions
Following the tradition of Stalnaker (1973, 1974, 1978), presuppositions are com-
monly taken to have two core properties. First, they generally are already taken for
granted by the discourse participants, i.e., they (typically) do not convey new infor-
mation. Secondly, they display special behavior in various embedding environments,
where—unlike asserted content—they are not affected by the embedding operator,
but rather ‘project’ to contribute their content at the global level of the utterance
(Karttunen 1973, 1974). Stalnaker’s account of presuppositional phenomena is
couched in a more general framework that models linguistic exchanges in terms of
information updates. The common ground represents information that is mutually
accepted by the discourse participants (for the purposes of the conversation), and can
be modeled as a set of possible worlds consistent with the propositions established
in the discourse. On the simplest view, anything that follows from the common
ground counts as presupposed. While Stalnaker’s view amounts to an essentially
pragmatic perspective, it is clear that there is a range of linguistic expressions that
are associated with a presupposition, i.e., in one way or another, they introduce a
pre-condition of sorts that the common ground must be of a certain type.
Developments in linguistic semantics in the 1980s (Heim 1982, 1983; Kamp
1981) adapted Stalnaker’s perspective by incorporating the notion of context and
the potential of expressions to change the context into the semantic system directly.
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Heim’s context change semantics reconstrued sentence meanings precisely in terms
of context change potentials. Presuppositions then can be seen as definedness
conditions on updating a given context with a sentence. Such an approach can
also account for projection phenomena, based on suitable assumptions for the
update procedures associated with the relevant embedding operators (Heim 1983).
Within Discourse Representation Theory (DRT; Kamp 1981), a similarly dynamic
approach is taken, but with an additional representational layer to keep track of the
cumulative information in a discourse explicitly. Accounts of presuppositions in
this framework generally see them as a form of anaphora, which require resolution
to some previously introduced piece of information in the discourse representation
structure (van der Sandt & Geurts 1991; van der Sandt 1992; Geurts 1999).
While dynamic approaches represent a more semantic view on presuppositions,
pragmatic accounts in a Stalnakerian spirit have recently seen a revival, with various
proposals for assimilating the analysis of at least certain types of presupposition
triggers to that of scalar implicatures (Abusch 2002, 2010; Romoli 2011). Schlenker
(2009) lays out a slightly different pragmatic approach, which essentially attempts to
recast the insights from Heim’s theory in non-dynamic terms, based on the (technical)
notion of a ‘Local Context’. This (and related proposals) is of particular interest
from a processing perspective, as it aims to capture presupposition projection in
terms of more general processing factors related to incremental interpretation.
In addition to these theoretical developments at a general level, various authors
have argued for the need to differentiate between different types of triggers, because
of differences in their behavior, e.g., with respect to their relation to the context, their
projection behavior, and their availability for accommodation. An early proposal
along these lines was made by Zeevat (1992), who distinguishes resolution triggers
(e.g., again) from lexical triggers (e.g., stop), based on the extent to which the triggers
rely directly on preceding expressions, and to what extent their presupposition is
tied up with the asserted meaning of the trigger. More recently, Abusch (2002,
2010) has distinguished ‘soft’ and ‘hard’ triggers (for other proposals for distinctions
between triggers, see Jayez 2013; Tiemann 2014). In the following, I will use
Abusch’s distinction, though the two expressions to be investigated will largely
fall on opposing sides on most classification schemes (including Zeevat’s), so the
choice is primarily a terminological one for the ease of presentation. To illustrate the
contrast briefly, one of the key differences between hard and soft triggers, according
to Abusch, concerns the extent to which their global impact can be suspended.
(2) I don’t know whether John ever played golf. . .
a. # But if he played golf again, . . .
b. X But if he stopped playing golf, . . .
The context sentence here is set up so as to be inconsistent with the following
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presupposition triggers. The hard trigger again in (2a) seems to lead to infelicity in
this context, while the presupposition of the soft trigger stop in (2b) can be suspended
(and perhaps instead be interpreted inside of the antecedent of the conditional).1
Abusch (2002, 2010) proposes an account of this difference by deriving soft triggers
based on reasoning about alternative expressions (see also Romoli 2014, who treats
soft triggers as implicatures).
2.2 Experimental results on presuppositions
Turning to experimental work on presuppositions, some of the crucial questions
are very much on par with those investigated in the experimental literature on
implicatures. In particular, in both cases, there are ongoing theoretical debates
about the status of the relevant inferences, which can be seen as either semantic
(i.e., encoded as part of the lexical content of certain expressions or structures) or
pragmatic (e.g., based on general reasoning). This question can be related to the
issue of the processing time-course of the relevant inferences: if the availability
of an inference is delayed relative to asserted content, that is commonly seen as
evidence in favor of pragmatic accounts. We will utilize parallel reasoning in our
experimental comparison between presupposition triggers. Beyond this issue of
processing time-course, presuppositions give rise to a host of additional questions
that are equally intriguing. For example, there is the question of how people reject
sentences with unsatisfied presuppositions (Syrett, Koev, Angelides & Kramer 2014;
Schwarz 2014b). Furthermore, the interaction of presuppositions with both the intra-
and extra-linguistic context, e.g., in presupposition projection, has rich potential
for experimental investigations (Chemla & Schlenker 2012; Schwarz & Tiemann
2012, 2013a). And last but not least, a detailed assessment of differences between
presupposition triggers has much to gain from experimental methodologies. In the
following, I provide a very brief review of some of the existing results directly
relevant to the present study. For a more comprehensive state-of-the-art report on
the current literature, see Schwarz 2014c (as well as the contributions to Schwarz
2014a).
Among the earliest attempts at assessing the time-course of presupposition
processing in comprehension is a set of reading studies based on manipulating the
felicity of a sentence containing a trigger in the presented context. For example,
Schwarz (2007) used contextual manipulations such as the following (slashes indicate
region boundaries in moving-window self-paced reading):
(3) a. The congressman / who wrote to John / . . .
1 See Jayez, Mongelli, Reboul & van der Henst 2014 for data that call into question the notion that the
contrast between hard and soft triggers is indeed as solid as Abusch presents it.
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b. The congressman / who John wrote to / . . .
. . . had also written to the mayor / . . .
The presupposition of also (here that the congressman had written to someone other
than the mayor as well, assuming default stress) is satisfied in the first variant but
not the second. Tiemann, Schmid, Bade, Rolke, Hertrich, Ackermann, Knapp &
Beck (2011) extend this approach to other triggers using word-by-word self-paced
reading (see also Tiemann, Kirsten, Beck, Hertrich & Rolke 2014; Tiemann 2014),
and Schwarz & Tiemann (2012) use eye tracking during reading on similar stimuli.
The general finding is that when the context is inconsistent with the presupposition
introduced by a trigger, this leads to (more or less) immediate slow-downs in reading.
This is attributed to the detection of the inconsistency, which in turn is indicative of
the availability of the presupposition.
More recently, various authors have begun to systematically compare presuppo-
sition triggers to one another using behavioral measures. For example, Cummins,
Amaral & Katsos 2013 and Amaral & Cummins 2014 find differences in acceptabil-
ity of responses to sentences containing triggers that challenge the presupposition
and begin with yes, but. . . or no, because. . . , and argue that Zeevat’s lexical triggers
generally are more compatible with the latter than resolution triggers. With respect to
the soft vs. hard distinction introduced by Abusch, Jayez et al. (2014) argue that even
a hard trigger such as too can be accommodated in the antecedent of conditionals.
But other authors report further data in support of differences between triggers (e.g.,
Smith & Hall 2011; Velleman, Beaver, Bumford, Destruel & Onea 2011; Destruel,
Onea, Velleman, Bumford & Beaver 2014). While these behavioral data have an
important role to play in better understanding individual triggers and the relationship
between them, it is also desirable to have more direct online measures on the various
triggers in order to compare their online processing properties. The studies below
present a first effort in this direction.
3 again and stop in the visual world paradigm
3.1 Aims & general design
The experiments below were designed to provide insights into the online processing
time-course of the triggers again and stop, both in relationship to one another
and, in case of the former, relative to asserted content. As these two triggers are
commonly classified as belonging to different groups of triggers such as hard and
soft, respectively, this will also inform the more general question of whether there
are corresponding differences in online processing. The paradigm employed is the
visual world eye tracking paradigm (Tanenhaus, Spivey-Knowlton, Eberhard &
Sedivy 1995), which makes it possible to observe unfolding interpretations in close
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to real time. Unlike the reading time studies mentioned above, it does not require
presentation of presuppositions in infelicitous contexts, as it can provide evidence
for the availability of a given interpretation while listening to felicitous sentences
and relating them to a visual context. The experimental task and stimuli are kept as
parallel as possible for both experiments to maximize comparability of the results
for the two triggers.
As is standard in visual world studies, we measured the timing of fixations on
different parts of a display relative to the unfolding auditory stimulus. The task was
to identify the individual that the sentence was about. During a certain time window,
only the presupposed inference made it possible to home in on one individual. Shifts
in fixations during that time window are indicative of the availability of the inference.
In addition to allowing us to track the shifting focus of attention throughout hearing
the linguistic stimuli, the visual world paradigm has the advantage of not requiring
any conscious decisions on the part of the subject. Eye movements are largely
beyond our conscious control, and the crucial role of the presupposed information
lasted only very briefly, as additional information introduced later on in the sentence
provided independent disambiguation. This reduced the risk of participants noticing
the nature of the experimental manipulation and developing explicit strategies that
could introduce effects that are artifacts of the task, rather than features of the regular
comprehension process.
3.2 Experiment 1: again vs. twice
Design The first experiment looked at the trigger again, which roughly presupposes
that an event of the sort described in the clause that it adjoins to has previously taken
place and is sufficiently salient in the discourse. In order to gain a comparison to
the time-course of processing asserted content, we compared again to twice, which
also conveys that some type of event has occurred more than once, but without any
presuppositionality involved. Since they also can occur in the same position in the
sentence, this affords us a rather minimal comparison between presupposed and
asserted content. In terms of methodology, we adapted the visual world paradigm
from studies of similar phenomena such as implicatures (e.g., Sedivy 2003; Huang
& Snedeker 2009), using a 2×2 interaction design. The first manipulation varied
whether one and the same crucial inference was presupposed or asserted. The other
manipulation was implemented by varying the pictures in the visual display, which
affected whether or not the target could be identified early on in the sentence during
an otherwise ambiguous period.
The visual displays included four characters: a target, a competitor, and two
opposite gender distractors. The task explained to the subjects in an introductory
screen was that they would have to decide which of the characters the sentence was
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Target Competitor (Critical) Competitor (Control)
Figure 1 Again/Twice visual stimuli.
about. To differentiate the individuals, we used a calendar strip paradigm, with
five boxes representing days of the week underneath each person. Some of the
boxes contained iconic representations of activities or food items. An illustration is
provided in Figure 1. A context sentence such as the one in (4a) was used to set the
scene and to ensure the felicity of the use of again/twice in the target sentence (here
by highlighting that there were golf and volleyball events at the beginning of the
week). The target sentences made it possible to identify which one of the depicted
figures the sentence is about (e.g., which one is John).
(4) a. Context: Some of these children went to play golf on Monday,
and some to play volleyball.
b. Target: John went to play golf. . . i. again later on . . .
ii. twice this week . . .
. . . and also played soccer on Tuesday.
Crucially, based on the choice of competitor picture, the point at which the target
could be identified varied. In the control condition, this was not possible until the
word soccer occurred near the end of the sentence, since only the target picture
involved a soccer event. In the critical condition, on the other hand, the target could
already be identified while hearing the underlined part of the sentence, starting with
again or twice, but only if the crucial inference that the relevant individual had
played golf at an earlier point in the week is available right away, as this is precisely
what distinguishes the critical competitor from the target. Thus, any shift in fixations
towards the target during the time window corresponding to that part of the sentence
indicates that subjects are able to access this inference. Note, however, that the
critical inference was not necessary for selecting the target at a global level, as the
later phrase involving soccer provided independent disambiguation at the end of the
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sentence. This was intended to prevent subjects from becoming aware of the critical
manipulation and the impact of the expressions of interest.
Participants, materials & procedure 27 students from the University of Penn-
sylvania participated in the experiment. 24 items parallel to those illustrated above
were constructed, with versions in each of the four conditions. Items were counter-
balanced across participants, who each saw 6 items per condition. In addition to the
experimental items, there were 24 other items from an independent experiment that
served as fillers. For each item, recordings of the relevant sentences were created.
Identical recordings of the again/twice-versions of the target sentence were used for
the critical and control conditions, and the same recording of the context sentence
was used for all four conditions. The visual stimuli were set up so that both the target
and the competitor always involved repetition of one of the types of events at the
beginning of the week in order to avoid the possibility of identifying targets based on
features of the visual stimuli alone. For similar reasons, the activity mentioned in the
target sentence corresponded to the first mentioned activity in the context sentence in
half of the items, and to the second mentioned one in the other half. At the beginning
of the experiment, participants were seated in front of a computer and an EyeLink
1000 eye tracker, which was calibrated to track the participant’s right eye. They then
saw an introductory screen with basic instructions and an illustration of the types
of pictures they would see, and subsequently performed a practice trial. Each trial
began with a fixation cross displayed in the middle of the screen. Next, the visual
display was shown for 3000ms before playback of the auditory recording began, so
that participants could familiarize themselves with the pictures shown. The trials
ended when the participant clicked on the picture they thought the sentence was
about, and were followed by a break of 1000ms prior to moving on to the next trial.
Data & Analysis The main dependent measure consisted of the proportion of
looks to the target picture during the period of interest, which began 200ms after
the onset of again/twice and ended 200ms after the onset of the independently
disambiguating expression (e.g., soccer) (the 200ms shift is due to the time it takes
to program and execute a saccade). Time-locking eye-movement data to the onset of
the critical word allows us to attribute the unfolding shift in fixations to the impact of
the inference of interest. Rather than analyzing plain proportions of fixations to the
target, we computed Target Advantage scores by subtracting looks to the competitor
from looks to the target. This relative measure provides a direct perspective on
any potential preference for the target, reflected in positive measures (0 being the
baseline reflecting equal amounts of looks to target and competitor). The graph in
Figure 2 illustrates target advantage scores for all four conditions.
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Figure 2 Target Advantage Scores across conditions. 0 marks the onset of again /
twice. Vertical line indicates mean onset of independent disambiguation.
Data from the control conditions (solid lines) hovers at zero, reflecting equal
likelihood of looking at target and competitor prior to the independent disambigua-
tion (indicated by the vertical line). As can be seen from the sharp rise right around
the onset of again/twice in the critical conditions (dashed lines), fixations are shifting
towards the target quickly and remain biased towards the target throughout the other-
wise ambiguous period. There is no apparent difference between the again and twice
conditions. To assess the effects statistically, we computed overall Target Advantage
scores for the ambiguous time window and transformed them into empirical logits
(Barr 2008). Analyses used mixed-effect models with subjects and items as random
effects, using the lmer function of the lme4 package in R (Bates 2005). Following
Barr, Levy, Scheepers & Tily (2013), the maximal random effect structure that would
converge was used in each case, with a random intercept as well as random slopes for
both main effects and the interaction. Full random effect structures converged and
were used unless otherwise noted. To assess whether inclusion of a given factor sig-
nificantly improved the fit of the overall model, likelihood-ratio tests were performed
that compared two minimally different models, one with the fixed effects factor in
question and one without, while keeping the random effects structure identical (Barr
et al. 2013). We report estimates, standard errors, and t-values for all models, as
well as the χ2 and p-value from the likelihood-ratio test for individual factors.
A 2×2 interaction model of the data revealed a significant main effect of the
critical vs. control manipulation (β = 4.78, SE = 0.62, t = 7.64; χ2 = 33.28, p<
.001), but no main effect for again vs. twice and no interaction (p′s> .8). To get a
more detailed perspective on the time-course of the shift in fixations, we conducted
the same analysis for data from the first 200ms of the ambiguous time window
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(i.e., 200-400ms after the onset of twice/again). This yielded the same result, with
a significant main effect of critical vs. control (β = 3.28, SE = 0.79, t = 4.15;
χ2 = 12.89, p< .001) and no other significant effects.2 Planned comparisons for
both the full ambiguous time window and its first 200ms further confirmed that the
effect of critical vs. control was significant for both the again- and twice-subsets
of the data. To address potential concerns that participants’ behavior adapts to
the nature of the stimuli over the course of the experiment, which could lead to
overestimating the speed with which the relevant inferences are available, additional
analyses including trial order within each session were conducted. The trial order
coefficients were not significantly different from zero and inclusion of this factor
did not significantly increase the models (for either the full time window or the first
200ms). Thus, there is no evidence of practice effects leading to adaptation and
increased predictability throughout the course of the experiment.
Discussion The rapid increase in fixations on the target following the onset of both
again and twice indicates that the key inference these expressions contribute (e.g.,
that John had played golf before in the week) is immediately available in online
processing. Furthermore, given that one of the expressions, namely again, introduces
this information as part of the presupposed content, this provides evidence for the
immediate availability of presupposed content in online processing. The comparison
with twice, which introduces the same inference but as part of the asserted content,
provides the most direct comparison of these two aspects of meaning to date with
regards to online processing. Both types of content seem to be available in parallel,
in contrast with (some of the) findings on scalar implicatures.
3.3 Experiment 2: stop
Design The second experiment extended the paradigm described above to investi-
gate presupposed inferences associated with the verb stop, namely that the activity
described by the complement verb phrase used to take place (whereas it asserts that
it is not taking place now). As noted in the introduction, stop has been characterized
as a soft trigger, and its presupposition analyzed in terms of reasoning about alter-
natives (Abusch 2010) or as a type of implicature (Romoli 2014). Given previous
findings in the literature that implicated content is delayed relative to literal, asserted
content (e.g., Huang & Snedeker 2009), such an analysis gives rise to the question
of how quickly the presupposed inference introduced by stop is available in online
processing.
2 As the model with the maximal random effects structure did not converge, the interaction term was
removed from the random effects structure for items.
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Figure 3 Visual stimuli for experiment on stop.
The calendar-strip paradigm was adapted for investigating this issue, by creating
sequences of like activities that could be described as stopping at some point. For
example, the target and competitor pictures in Figure 3 were paired with the context
and target sentences in (5):
(5) a. Context: These children got nice treats for their snacks this week.
b. Target: John stopped eating the delicious apples on Thursday.
The use of stop in the target sentence introduces the presupposition that John had
been eating apples at an earlier point of the week, which is only true of the target
character. However, prior to the realization of the word apples, the sentence is
equally compatible with the control competitor, who had been eating grapes earlier
in the week. Thus, apples is the point of disambiguation when comparing these two
pictures. In the critical condition, on the other hand, the competitor had no activities
at the beginning of the week, and thus cannot be described as stopping any activity
later on. In this case, it is precisely the presupposition of stop that makes it possible
to identify the target right upon hearing the trigger, prior to encountering apples (i.e.,
during the time window corresponding to the underlined portion of the sentence).
As before, independent disambiguation is provided towards the end of the sentence
(here at the point of apples, just as in the control condition).
Participants, materials and procedure 27 students from the University of Penn-
sylvania participated in the experiment. Critical items consisted of 24 pairs of
recordings of sentences and pictures along the lines illustrated above. Each item
came in four versions, based on the competitor picture manipulation and an addi-
tional manipulation of whether or not negation was included in the sentence. For
the moment, we will focus on the affirmative items only. (Results for negated items
will be discussed below.) Each participant saw 6 items per condition, with counter-
balancing across participant groups. In addition to the critical items, there were 24
12
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Figure 4 Target Advantage Scores by conditions. 0 marks the onset of stop.
Vertical line indicates mean onset of independent disambiguation.
items from another sub-experiment that served as fillers, as well as 24 genuine filler
items that addressed various potential counter-balancing concerns. Unlike in the
previous experiment, the display included only the target and competitor, i.e., there
were no additional gender distractors. The general procedure and instructions were
parallel to the first experiment. Due to the more limited number of figures within the
display, preview time before playback of the auditory recording was set to 2000ms.
Data & Analysis Data analysis proceeded as in the first experiment, with a focus
on target advantage scores for the time window corresponding to the underlined part
of the target sentence, which was ambiguous in the control condition and potentially
disambiguated by the presupposed inference introduced by stop. The graph in Figure
4 illustrates target advantage scores by condition.
Around the onset of stop, there is a shift in fixations to the target in the critical
condition, whereas no consistent bias is present in the control condition. As in the
first experiment, we assessed this difference statistically using mixed-effect models
run on elogits computed from the target advantage scores. Looking at the entire
time window of interest (from 200ms after the onset of stop until 200ms after the
onset of the disambiguating word, such as apples), there was a significant difference
between conditions, with greater target advantage scores in the critical condition
(β = 5.27, SE = 0.75, t = 6.99; χ2 = 10.1, p< .01). Looking at just the first 200ms
of this time window revealed that the effect was already present early on after the
onset of stop (β = 3.23, SE = 1.07, t = 3.02; χ2 = 8.98, p < .01). As in the first
experiment, we also constructed corresponding models with trial order as a factor,
but this did not significantly improve the model, providing evidence against any
significant practice effects that are relevant for the results of interest.
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Discussion The immediate shift in fixations towards the target after encounter of
the verb stop in the critical condition indicates that the presupposition of stop (e.g.,
that John had been eating apples earlier in the week) is immediately available in
online processing, as it provides the only possible piece of information that can help
to identify the target picture. As such, the results found here are entirely on par with
those for again in the first experiment. Assuming that an interpretation along these
lines can be maintained, this suggests that the soft and hard triggers looked at here
do not differ in their online processing time-course. However, there are some further
considerations we need to address, which we turn to in the next section.
4 General discussion & further issues
4.1 Entailed presuppositions?
Throughout the discussion of the two experiments above, we have assumed that
the inferences of again and stop in question are unequivocally presuppositional.
However, there is a common view in the literature that at least in the case of certain
presupposition triggers, the relevant inferences have a dual status of sorts, and
are entailed as well as presupposed. From such a perspective, evidence for the
availability of the relevant content is not necessarily indicative of the time-course of
presupposed content, as it might simply be a reflex of its status as an entailment. Not
all triggers are equally suitable for such a line of argument. Recent discussion by
Sudo (2012), for example, suggests that only the presuppositions of some triggers
are also entailed. While a more detailed assessment of his criteria for determining
this with respect to the triggers under investigation here is ultimately required, again
seems likely to pattern with those triggers that do not entail their presupposition, in
contrast with stop. This, of course, would have a direct impact on the interpretation
of our results, as it leaves open the possibility that the presupposition of the former
is indeed available immediately, whereas in the latter case, the immediate reflex of
the relevant inference is merely due to the fact that it is also entailed. This would be
a step towards making the results more consistent with analyses of soft triggers in
terms of alternatives or implicatures.
However, there is at least some initial evidence that speaks against attributing the
rapid availability of the presupposition of stop to its putative additional status as an
entailment. First, the entailment point becomes moot in the scope of negation, where
only the presupposition survives at the global level. Nonetheless, recent evidence
suggests that stop and again display parallel processing properties under negation as
well (see Schwarz & Tiemann 2013b, and data presented below). To the extent that
this holds, that speaks against analyzing the effects found here in different terms for
the two triggers we looked at.
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Assertion: False
Presupposition: True
;
Assertion: ??
Presupposition: False
;
Figure 5 Overt picture choices for Covered Box study on stop.
Even on a unified analysis of the data reported here, one could still maintain,
of course, that both are instances of triggers whose presupposition is also entailed.
However, recent findings on response times related to presupposed content from
our lab provide tentative evidence to the contrary. In particular, we have found that
rejections of sentences based on presupposed content are slower than rejections
based on asserted content. This has been reported for definite descriptions (Schwarz
2014b), but also seems to hold for the verb stop. In a study carried out with Cory
Bill and Jacopo Romoli, we used a covered box picture selection task to assess the
availability of various interpretations of stop in different contexts. Participants had
to choose whether a given sentence matched an overtly shown one or one that was
hidden from view instead, under the assumption that only one of the two would
match the sentence. One of the contrasts we included varied whether the overtly
shown picture violated the presupposed or the asserted content of stop. For example,
the sentence in (6) would be paired with either one of the pictures in Figure 5, along
with an alternative covered box choice.
(6) John stopped going to the movies on Wednesday.
The picture on the left is one that should be rejected based on asserted content
alone, since the presupposition (that John had been going to the movies earlier)
clearly is met. For the picture on the right, our perspective on the basis for rejection
depends on whether we assume the presupposition to double as entailed content. If
it does, then the rejection here could be based on either type of content (or possibly
both). Interestingly, while rejection rates (in the form of covered box choices)
are at ceiling for both conditions, response times for rejections based on asserted
content alone are significantly faster than rejections of the picture on the right
(2692ms vs. 3562ms). This is more compatible with the view that the presupposition
does not feature in what is entailed as well, in particular if we assume that any
evidence for rejection is acted on as soon as it is encountered (for evidence that
can be argued to support this view, see Schwarz 2014b). For the picture on the
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Target
;
Competitor (Critical)
;
Competitor (Control)
;
Figure 6 Visual stimuli for negated conditions in the experiment on stop.
right could also be rejected based on asserted content alone if the presupposition
indeed features as an entailment of the sentence. So why should it matter that it is
additionally presupposed, if a decision can be made based on what is asserted alone?
Interestingly, the same pattern can be found in negated cases as well, where—
as mentioned above—the issue of entailment becomes moot. This again would
seem to speak against seeing affirmative and negated cases as involving different
circumstances with respect to the status of the presupposed content. While it may be
possible to understand this data from a perspective that sees the presupposition of
stop as part of what is entailed as well, these results lend at least tentative support to
the view that they are not, since this accounts for the difference in response times
straightforwardly.
4.2 Presupposition projection: don’t stop
As already mentioned, there is further evidence for stop and again to behave in
parallel ways under negation, which bears on the issue of whether their presuppo-
sitions might be entailed in affirmative cases, and furthermore whether they might
differ from one another in that regard. Schwarz & Tiemann (2012, 2013b) provide
evidence from reading time studies on German wieder (‘again’) for a processing cost
of presupposition projection under negation and in conditionals. In brief, detecting
inconsistencies of the presupposition with the discourse context seems to take longer
when the presupposition trigger is introduced in an embedded environment. As part
of the visual world study on stop reported above, we also included conditions with
stop appearing in the scope of negation. Using the same logic as laid out above, we
paired pictures like those in Figure 6 with recordings of the sentences in (7).
(7) a. Context: These children got nice treats for their snacks this week.
b. Target: Henry didn’t stop eating the delicious apples all week.
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Figure 7 Target Advantage Scores by condition, including negated stop items. 0
marks the onset of stop. Vertical line indicates mean onset of indepen-
dent disambiguation.
Just as in the affirmative version, the presupposition of stop makes it possible to
identify the target in the critical condition upon the encounter of stop, whereas
independent disambiguation is necessary in the control condition.
Target advantage scores for both affirmative and negated conditions are plotted in
Figure 7. While the negated condition does show an increase in fixations to the target
prior to the independent disambiguation, this does not seem to happen as quickly
as in the affirmative condition. While space constraints prevent me from presenting
a detailed statistical analysis, the most crucial finding is that there is a significant
interaction in the ambiguous time-window (β = 2.28, SE = 1.26, t = 1.82; χ2 =
5.67, p< .05), which seems to be due to the temporary difference in relation between
control and critical conditions for affirmative and negated versions respectively. This
preliminary finding then suggests that projection of the presupposition of stop is
associated with a delay comparable to that reported by Schwarz & Tiemann (2012,
2013b) for again. This, in turn, further supports the view that the equivalent finding
of rapid availability of presupposed content of again and stop (in affirmative contexts)
in the present studies does not come about in different ways, but rather does constitute
evidence for the immediate presence of presupposed content (whether introduced by
a hard or a soft trigger) once a trigger is encountered.
4.3 Conclusion and outlook
We have considered evidence from two visual world experiments on the presuppo-
sition triggers again and stop, which are commonly argued to belong to different
sub-classes of triggers, with potentially different mechanisms giving rise to the
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relevant inferences. Our data suggests that in both cases, the presupposed content is
available rapidly. In the case of again, we furthermore provided a direct comparison
with essentially the same content when asserted, in the form of twice, and found no
difference in the time-course of the inference becoming available. These findings
are in line with previous visual world findings for also (Romoli, Khan, Snedeker &
Sudo 2014; Schwarz 2014d). They enhance our understanding of the time-course
of presupposition processing beyond what was known from previous reading time
evidence, in that they provide a more detailed level of temporal resolution while
allowing us to observe the natural unfolding of the interpretation process in fully
felicitous contexts.
The present results suggest that there are no differences between the soft and hard
triggers we looked at when it comes to processing time-course, but of course there
may be other grounds for differentiating classes of triggers that are independent of
that. In line with previous findings, the immediate availability of presupposed content
speaks against views that would assume presuppositions to arise through pragmatic
inferencing that is costly, and therefore delayed, in terms of online processing. They
are fully compatible with semantic views of presuppositions that take them to be
conventionally encoded as part of the lexical entries of the relevant expressions. But
they are also compatible with pragmatic proposals if we assume that the relevant
type of pragmatic content is rapidly available, as has been argued for other cases in
various other studies within the visual world paradigm.
On a more general level, the present studies provide a proof of concept of sorts,
in that they show that we can use the powerful psycholinguistic tools employed
here to study detailed aspects of presupposition interpretation and related theoretical
questions. Much of the work in this area still lies ahead. For one, it will be crucial to
gain further evidence on whether presuppositions should also be seen as entailed, at
least for certain triggers, since this plays a crucial role for the interpretation of the
present data, as reviewed above. Further issues, several of which we have already
begun to pursue in our lab (largely in collaboration with Cory Bill and Jacopo
Romoli), include a more direct comparison of presuppositions and implicatures, in
particular with respect to embedding under negation; a closer look at presupposition-
related behavior in different populations, such as young children and populations
with language-related disorders; and investigation of other embedding environments,
e.g., embedding under attitude verbs. With the tools at hand, the prospect for
theoretical insights from empirical investigations along these lines seems promising.
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